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Abstract
An increasingly important tool for securing
computer networks is the use of deceptive decoy
objects (e.g., fake hosts, accounts, or files) to detect,
confuse, and distract attackers. One of the well-known
challenges in using decoys is that it can be challenging
to design effective decoys that are hard to distinguish
from real objects, especially against sophisticated
attackers who may be aware of the use of decoys.
A key issue is that both real and decoy objects have
observable features that may give the attacker the ability
to distinguish one from the other. However, a defender
deploying decoys may be able to modify some features
of either the real or decoy objects (at some cost) making
the decoys more effective. We present a game-theoretic
model of two-sided deception that models this scenario.
We present an empirical analysis of this model to show
strategies for effectively concealing decoys, as well as
some limitations of decoys for cybersecurity.

1.

Introduction

Both civilian and military computer networks are
under increasing threat from cyber attacks, with the most
significant threat posed by Advanced Persistent Threat
(APT) actors. These attackers use sophisticated methods
to compromise networks and remain inside, establishing
greater control and staying for long periods to gather
valuable data and intelligence. These attackers seek
to remain undetected, and estimates from APT attacks
show that they are often present in a network for months
before they are detected [1].
Cyber deception methods use deceptive decoy
objects like fake hosts (honeypots), network traffic,
files, and even user accounts to counter attackers in a
variety of ways [2, 3, 4]. They can create confusion for
attackers, make them more hesitant and less effective
in executing further attacks, and can help to gather
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information about the behavior and tools of various
attackers. They can also increase the ability of defenders
to detect malicious activity and actors in the network.
This deception is especially critical in the case of
APT attackers, who are often cautious and skilled at
evading detection [5]. Widespread and effective use of
honeypots and other deceptive objects is a promising
approach for combating this class of attackers.
However, the effectiveness of honeypots and other
deceptive objects depends crucially on whether the
honeypot creators can design them to look similar
enough to real objects, to prevent honeypot detection
and avoidance. This design goal especially holds for
APT threats, which are likely to be aware of the use
of such deception technologies and will actively seek
to identify and avoid honeypots, and other deceptive
objects, in their reconnaissance [5, 6]. A well-known
problem with designing successful honeypots is that
they often have characteristics that can be observed by
an attacker that will reveal the deception [7]. Examples
of such characteristics include the patterns of network
traffic to a honeypot, the response times to queries, or
the configuration of services which are not similar to real
hosts in the network. However, with some additional
effort, these characteristics can be made more effective
in deception (e.g., by simulating more realistic traffic to
and from honeypots).
We introduce a game-theoretic model of the problem
of designing effective decoy objects that can fool even
a sophisticated attacker. In our model, real and fake
objects may naturally have different distributions of
characteristic features than an attacker could use to
tell them apart. However, the defender can make
some (costly) modifications to either the real or the
fake objects to make them harder to distinguish. This
model captures some key aspects of cyber deception
that are missing from other game-theoretic models. In
particular, we focus on whether the defender can design
convincing decoy objects, and what the limitations of
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deception are if some discriminating features of real and
fake objects are not easily maskable.
We present several analyses of fundamental
questions in cyber deception based on our model. We
analyze how to measure the informativeness of the
signals in our model, and then consider how effectively
the defender can modify the features to improve the
effectiveness of deception in various settings. We show
how different variations in the costs of modifying the
features can have a significant impact on the effects of
deception. We also consider the differences between
modifying only the features of deceptive objects and
being able to modify both real and deceptive objects
(two-sided deception).
While this is not always
necessary, in some cases, it is essential to enable
effective deception. We also consider deception against
naı̈ve attackers, and how this compares to the case
of sophisticated attackers. Finally, we discuss how
our model relates to work in adversarial learning and
how this model could be applied beyond the case of
honeypots to, for example, generating decoy network
traffic.

2.

Motivating Domain and Related Work

While the model we present may apply to many
different types of deception and deceptive objects, we
will focus on honeypots as a specific case to make
our discussion more concrete and give an example of
how this model captures essential features of real-world
deception problems. Honeypots have had a considerable
impact on cyber defense in the 30 years since they were
first introduced [8].
Over time, honeypots have been used for
many different purposes, and have evolved to
more sophisticated designs with more advanced
abilities to mimic real hosts and to capture useful
information about attackers [9, 10, 11].
The
sophistication of honeypots can vary dramatically,
from limited low-interaction honeypots to sophisticated
high-interaction honeypots [9, 12, 13].
Here, we do not focus on the technological
advancements of honeypots, but rather on the
game-theoretic investigation of honeypot deception.
There have been numerous works that emphasize this
game-theoretic approach to cyber deception as well.
Our work builds upon the Honeypot Selection Game
(HSG), described by Pı́bil et al. [14, 3]. Much like
the HSG, we model the game using an extensive form
game. We extend the HSG model with the introduction
of features, which are modifiable tokens in each
host that enable more robust deceptions and allow to
model more realistic settings. Several game-theoretic

models have been established for other cyber defense
problems [15, 16, 17, 18], specifically for deception
as well [19, 20], however these consider attribute
obfuscation as the means of deception rather than use of
decoy objects.
[21] notably investigates the use of honeypots in the
smart grid to mitigate denial-of-service attacks through
the lens of Bayesian games. [22] also model honeypots
mitigating denial-of-service attacks in a similar fashion
but in the Internet-of-Things domain. [23] tackles a
similar “honeypots to protect social networks against
DDoS attacks” problem with Bayesian game modeling.
These works demonstrate the broad domains where
honeypots can aid. This work differs in that we do not
model a Bayesian incomplete information game.
A couple of works also consider the notion of
two-sided deception, where the defender deploys not
only real-looking honeypots but also fake-looking
real hosts. Rowe et al. demonstrate that using
two-sided deception offers an improved defense by
scaring off attackers [24]. Caroll and Grosu introduced
the signaling deception game where signals bolster a
deployed honeypot’s deception [25]. Our work differs
in that we define specific features (signals) that can be
altered and revealed to the attacker. Shi et al. introduce
the mimicry honeypot framework, which combines real
nodes, honeypots, and fake-looking honeypots to derive
equilibria strategies to bolster defenses [26]. They
validated their work in a simulated network. This notion
of two-sided deception is quickly becoming a reality;
De Gaspari et al. provided a prototype proof-of-concept
system where production systems also engaged in active
deception [27].

3.

Honeypot Feature Selection Game

We now present a formal model of the Honeypot
Feature Selection Game (HFSG). This game models the
optimal decisions for a player (the defender) who is
trying to disguise the identity of real and fake objects
so that the other player (the attacker) is not able to
reliably distinguish between them. Each object in the
game is associated with a vector of observable features
(characteristics) that provides an informative signal that
the attacker can use to detect fake objects more reliably.
The defender can make (limited) changes to these
observable features, at a cost. Unlike many models of
deception, we consider the possibility that the defender
can make changes to both the real and fake objects; we
refer to this as 2-sided deception.
The original feature vector is modeled as a move
by nature in a Bayesian game.
Real and fake
objects have different probabilities of generating every
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possible feature vector. How useful the features are to
the attacker depends on how similar the distributions
for generating the feature vectors are; very similar
distributions have little information while very different
distributions may precisely reveal which objects are real
or fake. The defender can observe the features and
may choose to pay some cost to modify a subset of
the features. The attacker observes this modified set
of feature vectors and chooses which object to attack.
The attacker receives a positive payoff if he selects a
real object, and a negative one if he selects a honeypot.
To keep the initial model simple, we focus on binary
feature vectors to represent the signals. We will also
assume that the defender can modify a maximum of
one feature. Both of these can be generalized in a
straightforward way, at the cost of a larger and more
complex model.

3.1.

Figure 1. The extensive form game tree with one
real host, one honeypot and 1 feature in each host.
The importance value of real host is 10 whereas the
modification cost of a feature is 3. The same values
for the honeypot are 5, 1 resp.

Formal definition of Honeypot Feature
Selection Game

We now define the Honeypot Feature
Selection Game (HFSG) formally by the tuple
G = (K r , K h , N, v r , v h , C r , C h , P r , P h , τ, χ).
• K r denotes the set of real hosts and K h denotes
the set of honeypots. Altogether, we have the
complete set of hosts K = K r ∪ K h . We denote
the cardinalities of these by k = |K|, r = |K r |,
h = |K h |.
• [n] is the set of features that describe any given
host. The sequence of feature values of a host is
referred to as its configuration. Thus, the set of
different possible configurations is {0, 1}n .
• v r , v h denote the importance values of the real
hosts and honeypots resp.
• C r , C h denote the cost vectors associated with
modifying a single feature of a real host and a
honeypot resp., and are indexed by the set of
features N . Thus, Cir is the cost of modifying the
ith feature of a real host.
• P r : {0, 1}n → [0, 1] is probability distribution
over feature vectors for real hosts
• P h : {0, 1}n → [0, 1] is the probability
distribution over feature vectors for honeypots
• The collection of all possible information sets is
denoted by τ .
• χ : {0, 1}kn × D → τ is a function that given the
initial network and a defender action, outputs the

attacker’s resultant information set I ∈ τ . Here,
D is the set of defender actions.
An example of a small HFSG with 1 real host,
1 honeypot, and 1 feature for each host is shown
in Figure 1. The probability distributions P r (0) =
P r (1) = 0.5, and P h (0) = P h (1) = 0.5 are randomly
generated for each feature combination.

3.2.

Nature Player Actions

We assume that both players know the probability
distributions P r and P h that define how the feature
vectors are selected by nature for real and honeypot
hosts, respectively. Nature generates the network
configurations as per the distributions P r and P h .
Thus, the network state x = (x1 , . . . , xk ) is generated
as per the joint distribution P x where P x (x) =
Qr
Qk
r
h
Both players can
i=1 P (xi ) ×
i=r+1 P (xi ).
x
compute the distribution P . For example, in Figure 1
P x = 0.25 for network 0R1D is calculated from
P r (0) = 0.5 and P h (1) = 0.5.

3.3.

Defender Actions

The defender observes the network configuration
x ∈ X, selected by nature as per probability distribution
P x . Then he chooses an appropriate action d ∈ D,
which is to change at most one feature of any single
host. Thus, D has nk + 1 different actions. This action
results in a configuration x0 ∈ {0, 1}nk that the attacker
observes, defining his information set I ∈ τ as described
previously. In the example of Figure 1, given the initial
network configuration 0R0D, the defender can alter a
feature which results into 0R1D or 1R0D, or make no
change leading to 0R0D as the attacker’s observation.
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3.4.

Attacker Actions

The attacker observes the set of feature vectors for
each network, but does not directly know which ones
are real and which are honeypot. Thus, any permutation
of the host configurations is perceived identically by
the attacker. Hence, the attacker’s information set is
merely characterized by the combination of the host
configurations and thus represented as a multiset on the
set of host configurations as the Universe. For example,
in Figure 1, the networks 0R1D and 1R0D belong to the
same information set. Given the attacker’s information
set, he decides which host to attack. When indexing
the attack options, we write the information set as an
enumeration of the k host configurations, and we assume
a lexicographically sorted order as a convention. Given
this order, we use a binary variable aIi to indicate that
when he is in the information set I, the attacker’s action
is to attack host i ∈ K.

3.5.

strategies on all valid sequences using a formulated LP
as follows, where Ud and Ua are the utilities of the
defender and the attacker. To solve the program, we
construct a matrix X[0 : 2kn ] of all possible network
configurations, and then the defender chooses a network
x ∈ X to modify. In network x, any action d of the
defender leads to an information set I for the attacker.
Different defender’s actions in different networks can
lead to the same information set I ∈ τ . Then, in every
information set I, the attacker chooses a best response
action to maximize his expected utility.
max

action involved modifying ith feature of a real host or
j th feature of a honeypot respectively.

s.t.

(1)

X

Ua (x, j, i)dxj P x aIi ≥

(x,j):χ(x,j)=I

X

Ua (x, j, i0 ) dxj P x aIi

(x,j):χ(x,j)=I

∀i, i0 ∈ K
dxj

∀I ∈ τ

(2)

≥ 0 ∀x ∈ X ∀j ∈ D
X
dxj = 1 ∀x ∈ X

(3)
(4)

jD

X

aIi = 1 ∀I ∈ τ

(5)

iK

The program’s objective is to maximize the defender’s
expected utility, assuming that the attacker will also
play a best response. In the above program, the only
unknown variables are the defender’s actions D (the
strategies of a defender in a network x ∈ X) and the
attacker’s actions aI . The inequality in Equation 2
ensures that the attacker plays his best response in this
game, setting the binary variable aIi to 1 only for the
best response i in each information set. Equation 3
ensures that the defender strategies in a network x is a
valid probability distribution. Equation 4 makes sure
that all probability for all network configurations sum
to 1. Finally, Equation 5 ensures that the attacker plays
pure strategies.

4.
3.6.

χ(x,j)

Ud (x, j, i) dxj P x ai

xX jD iK

Utility Functions

A terminal state t in the extensive form game tree is
characterized by the sequence of actions that the players
(nature, defender, attacker) take. The utilities of the
players can be identified based on the terminal state
that the game reaches. Thus, given a terminal state
t as a tuple (x, j, a) of the player actions, we define
a function U (t) = U (x, j, a) such that the attacker
gains this value while the defender loses as much. That
is, this function serves as the zero-sum component of
the player rewards. In particular, if the action a in
the information set χ(x, j) corresponds to a real host,
then U (x, j, a) = v r , whereas, if it corresponds to
a honeypot, then U (x, j, a) = −v h . Intuitively, the
successful identification of a real host gives a positive
reward to the attacker otherwise gives a negative reward
that is equal to the importance value of a honeypot.
The expected rewards are computed by summing over
the terminal states and considering the probabilities of
reaching them. Finally, the defender additionally also
incurs the feature modification cost Cir or Cjh if his

XXX

Empirical Study of HFSG

Defender’s Linear Program

We can solve this extensive form game with
imperfect information using a linear program. For
solving this game in sequence form [28], we create
a path from the root node to the terminal node that is
a valid sequence and consists of a list of actions for
all players. Then we compute defender’s behavioral

The HFSG game model allows us to study
the strategic aspects of cyber deception against a
sophisticated adversary who may be able to detect the
deception using additional observations and analysis. In
particular, we can evaluate the effectiveness of cyber
deception under several different realistic assumptions
about the costs and benefits of deception, as well as
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the abilities of the players. We identify cases where
deception is highly beneficial, as well as some cases
where deception has limited or no value. We also show
that in some cases, using two-sided deception is critical
to the effectiveness of deception methods.

4.1.

Measuring the Similarity of Features

One of the key components of our model is that
real hosts and honeypots generate observable features
according to different probability distributions. The
similarity of these distributions has a large effect on the
strategies in the game, and the outcome of the game.
Intuitively, if out-of-the-box honeypot solutions look
indistinguishable from existing nodes on the network
the deception will be effective without any additional
intervention by the defender. However, when the
distributions of features are very dissimilar the defender
should pay higher costs to modify the features to
disguise the honeypots. In some cases this may not
be possible, and the attacker will always be able to
distinguish the real hosts and honeypots.
Measuring the similarity of the feature distributions
is a somewhat subtle issue, since the defender can make
changes to a limited number of features. Standard
approaches such as Manhattan distance or Euclidean
distance do not provide a good way to compare the
similarity due to these constraints. We use a measure
based on the Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) [29],
which can be seen as the minimum distance required
to shift one pile of earth (probability distribution) to
look like another. This measure can be constrained by
the legal moves, so probability is only shifted between
configurations that are reachable by the defender’s
ability to change features.
In the experiments, we allow the defender to modify
only a single feature in the network and the EMD
determines the minimum cost needed to transform a
weighted set of features to another where the probability
of each feature configuration is the weight. The ground
dissimilarity between two distributions is calculated by
the Hamming distance. This distance between two
distributions of equal length is the number of positions
at which the comparing features are dissimilar. In other
words, it measures the minimum number of feature
modification or unit change required to make two sets
of feature indistinguishable. We model the distance
from moving the probability of one configuration (e.g.,
turning [0, 0] into [0, 1]) to another by flipping of a single
bit at a time with a unit cost of 1. This can be seen
visually in Figure 2 where we calculate the EMD of
moving the honeypot’s initial distribution into that of the
real node’s initial distribution.

Figure 2. Earth Mover’s Distance process. a)
Displays the initial feature configuration probability
distributions Pr and Ph and where to move slices of
the distribution from Ph and b) Shows the updated Ph
after the conversion, resulting in a final EMD of 0.5.

In our experiments we will often show the impact of
varying levels of similarity in the feature distributions.
We generated 1000 different initial distributions for the
features using uniform random sampling. We then
calculated the similarities using the constrained EMD
and selected 100 distributions so that we have 10
distributions in each similarity interval. We randomly
select these 10 for each interval from the ones that
meet this similarity constraint in the original sample.
This is necessary to balance the sample because random
sampling produces many more distributions that are
very similar than distributions that are further apart,
and we need to ensure a sufficient sample size for
different levels of similarity. we present the results
by aggregating over the similarity intervals of 0.1 and
average ten results in each interval.

4.2.

Deception with Symmetric Costs

Our first experiment investigates the impact of
varying the similarity of the feature distributions. We
also vary the values of real host and honeypot. As the
similarity of the distributions P r and P h decreases, we
would expect a decrease in overall expected defender
utility. We can see this decrease in Figures 3a and 3b
as we vary the similarity measured using EMD. In
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Figure

RIV

3a
3b
4 (Both (A))
4 (Both (B))
4 (Both (C))
5 (Exp-1)
5 (Exp-2)
6 (Exp-1)
6 (Exp-2)
6 (Exp-3)
6 (Exp-4)
6 (Exp-5)
8

1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0

RMC
F1
F2
0.25 0.1
0.25 0.1
0.25 0.1
0.5
0.2
1.0
0.5
0.1
∞
0.1
∞
0.2
0.2
0.15 0.25
0.1
0.3
0.05 0.35
0.0
0.4
0.25 0.1

HpMC
F1
F2
0.1 0.25
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.1
∞
∞
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.25 0.15
0.3
0.1
0.35 0.05
0.4
0.0
0.2
0.1

HpIV
0.5
1.0
0.5
0.5
0.5
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0

Table 1. Parameters used in HFSG experiments.
RIV denotes real system’s importance value, RMC
denotes real system’s feature modification cost, HpIV
denotes importance value of honeypot and HpMC
denotes feature modification cost of honeypot. All
numbers are normalized to 1

Figures 3a and 3b, we compare the utility differences
between an optimal defender that can only modify
the features of the honeypot (one-sided deception), an
optimal defender that can modify features of both the
honeypot and real host (two-sided deception), and a
baseline defender that cannot make any modifications
against a fully rational best response attacker.
In Figure 3a, the honeypot has the same importance
value as the real host, while in Figure 3b, the honeypot
value is half of the real host. The first observation is
that in both cases the value of deception is high relative
to the baseline with no deception, and this value grows
dramatically as the feature distributions become more
informative (higher EMD). In general, the defender does
worse in cases where the hosts have different values.
Two-sided deception does have a small advantage in
cases with highly informative features, but the effect
is small. Here, the costs of modifying the features are
symmetric, so there is little advantage in being able
to modify the feature on either the honeypot or the
real host, since the defender can choose between these
options without any penalty.
To further investigate the issue of one-sided and
two-sided deception, we fix the honeypot features
modification costs and increased real host modification
costs as reflected in Table 1. Here, we compare how
increasing the real host’s feature modification negatively
affects the defender’s expected utility. As the cost for
modifying the real hosts increases relative to the cost
of modifying honeypots, the defender must make more
changes on honeypots in order to maximize his utility.

Figure 3. Comparison of defender utility when the
real host’s importance value a) doubles that of the
honeypot and b) equals that of the honeypot. Here
we see one-sided deception provides a comparable
defense despite a high initial dissimilarity.

Altering the real system in this case is not feasible and
does not provide a good return on investment.
Traditionally network administrators avoid altering
features in their real hosts on the network and simply
employ one-sided deception, attempting to alter the
honeypot to look like a real host. In the case where
modifying a real host to look less believable might be be
too costly or even impossible, one-sided deception is an
obvious choice as demonstrated in Figure 4. However,
when these real feature modifications are not too costly,
we see that two-sided provides a noticeable increase in
defenses when the feature distributions are increasingly
dissimilar.

4.3.

Deception with Asymmetric Costs

While the results so far have suggested that
one-sided deception may be nearly as effective as
two-sided deception, they have all focused on settings
where the costs of modifying features are symmetric
for real and fake hosts. We now investigate what
happens when the costs of modifying different features
are asymmetric. We start with the extreme case where
some features may not be possible to modify at all.
In our examples with two features, we can set the
unmodifiable features for the real and honeypot hosts to
be the same or to be opposite. In Figure 5, we show the
results of the game when we set the modification costs of
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Figure 4. Comparison of defender utility when the
cost of modifying the real host features is different
than modifying the honeypot features.

Figure 5. Comparison of defender utility when some
features cannot be modified.

some features to infinity. If the same feature for the real
host and honeypot are unmodifiable, then there is little
the defender can do to deceive an intelligent attacker
when they are highly dissimilar. However, when the
features that cannot be modified are different for the real
and honeypot hosts, we see a very different situation.
In this case the defender benefits greatly from being
able to use two-sided deception, since he can avoid the
constraints by modifying either the real or fake hosts as
needed.
In our next experiment, we investigate less extreme
differences in the costs of modifying features. We
set the costs so that they are increasingly different for
real and honeypot hosts, so modifying one feature is
cheap for one but expensive for the other, but not
impossible. We show the results of using either one or
two-sided deception for varying levels of initial feature
distribution similarity in Figure 6. The specific costs
are given in Table 1. We see that there is very little
difference when the initial distributions are similar; this
is intuitive since the attacker has little information and
deception is not very valuable in these cases. However,
we see a large difference when the initial distributions
are informative. As the difference in the feature
modification costs increases, the value of two-sided
deception increases, indicating that this asymmetry is

Figure 6. Impact of modification cost over various
initial similarity parameters.

crucial to understanding when two-sided deception is
necessary to employ effective deception tactics.
We also expect that the number of features available
to the players will have a significant impact on
the value of deception. While the current optimal
solution algorithm does not scale well, we can evaluate
the differences between small numbers of features,
holding all else equal.
Figure 7.
presents the
results of the modeling HFSG with variable number of
features.We found that when the number of features is
increased two-sided deception becomes more effective
than one-sided deception. The defender in this case
has more opportunity to alter the network by changing
the features and make it the more confusing network to
the attacker. However, the defender payoff decreases
with more features due to the constraint on how many
features he can modify and the total cost of modifying
these features.
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worst case is when the defender performs no deceptive
actions against a fully rational attacker. These two
cases form an upper- and lower-bound as seen in
Figure 8. Two-sided deception is more effective in this
case when the feature distributions are similar, while
the opposite was true for a rational attacker. Overall,
deception strategies are much more effective against
naı̈ve attackers.

5.
Figure 7. Comparison of defender utility when
increasing the number of features.

4.4.

Deception with Naı̈ve Attackers

Our model gives a new and more nuanced way to
think about the quality of different deception strategies,
and how robust they are to an adversary being able to see
through the deception. We can identify which features
the defender should focus on modifying to make the
deception more effective, including features of the real
objects. In addition, we can correctly identify cases
where deception is not the best solution because the
costs of creating a believable deception may be higher
than the value they create. We conclude by discussing
some connections to adversarial machine learning and
an additional case where our model could be applied
beyond honeypots.

5.1.
Figure 8. Comparison of defender utility of a naı̈ve
attacker versus a fully rational attacker. Here, the
naı̈ve attacker does not consider the defender’s utility
or strategy at all.

The previous empirical results all assumed a
cautiously rational attacker who actively avoided
attacking honeypots. This is a common practice,
because fully rational actors present the highest threat.
In cybersecurity, these fully rational attackers might be
an experienced hacker or APT. However, these are not
the only threats faced in cybersecurity and we cannot
assume that these attacking agents are always cautious
and stealthy. For example, many attacks on networks
may be conducted by worms or automated scripts that
are much simpler and may be much more easily fooled
by deceptive strategies.
We now consider a more naı̈ve attacker that does
not consider the defender’s deception. He observes
the hosts on the network and assumes no modifications
were made. Based on all observations for a particular
network he calculates his best response, but does predict
the defender’s optimal strategy. The results of the
experiment are shown in Figure 8 and the costs given
in Table 1.
The best case is when the defender can perform
two-sided deception against a naı̈ve attacker and the

Discussion and Further Applications

Adversarial Learning

Recently, adversarial machine learning models have
shown great promise in generating deceptive objects,
focusing mostly on images and video applications [30,
31, 32], though they have the potential to generalize
to many other types of deceptive objects.
The
most well-known approach is Generative Adversarial
Networks (GAN) [33], which rely on a pair of neural
networks, one to generate deceptive inputs, and the
other to detect differences between real and fake inputs.
The intuition for these is often that the networks are
playing a zero-sum game, though the interpretation is
vague and there is no formal game presented. Our
model can be viewed as a formalization of the game
these types of machine learning algorithms are playing,
though there are some differences. We specifically
consider the costs of modifying different features of
the objects, as well as the possibility of modifying the
real distribution in addition to the fake one. On the
other hand, GANs typically are used in much larger
problems with vast numbers of complex features, and
they do not find optimal solutions. Also, they use
abstracted representations of the feature space in the
learning process, and it is not clear exactly how this
works or what the implications are.
We believe that further developing and scaling
this model to address more complex feature deception
problems will help to understand the theoretical qualities
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of GANs and related methods better. In particular,
we can better understand the limits that these AML
methods may have based on the costs and infeasibility
of modifying features in some cases, as well as giving
optimal or bounded approximations of the solutions
to small feature deception games, which can then be
used to provide clear quality comparisons for machine
learning methods that may scale to much more complex
problems but without specific quality guarantees.

5.2.

Disguising Network Traffic

While we presented our model using honeypots as
a motivating domain, there are many other possible
applications. We briefly discuss another example here
to make this point. There are many reasons to disguise
network traffic to look like other traffic; defenders
may wish to do this to generate fake traffic to support
honeypots or to conceal the properties of real traffic on
their networks otherwise. Attackers also may want to
make their network traffic appear similar to real traffic
to avoid detection.
While network traffic, in general, has a very large
number of possible features, an increasing fraction of
traffic is encrypted, which hides many of the deep
features of the data. However, it is still possible to
do an analysis of encrypted traffic based on the source,
destination, routing, timing and quantity characteristics,
etc. Our model can be used to analyze how to optimize
the properties of real and decoy traffic to improve the
effectiveness of the decoy traffic, based on the costs of
modifying different features. For example, modifying
traffic to be sent more frequently will clearly have costs
in increased network congestion, while modifying some
features of the real traffic may not be feasible at all (e.g.,
the source and destination). Even simple versions of
our model with relatively few features could be used
to optimize decoy network traffic in encrypted settings,
where there is limited observable information about the
traffic. The unencrypted case allows for many more
possible features, so it would require larger and more
complex versions of our model to analyze, which would
require more scalable algorithms to solve exactly using
our model, or the application of approximation methods
and adversarial learning techniques.

5.3.

Limitations

The time and memory complexities of the game
model depend on n, k, feature modification options,
and the amount of sampling; which makes the model
grow exponentially. To avoid computational complexity,
we tested our model with two machines, one each of
type (real and honeypot) with two features in each.

Extending the model to include more machine types and
features is straightforward, although the optimization
problem will become much more difficult to solve. A
scalable algorithm will need to be developed to solve
larger size games.

6.

Conclusions

Deception is becoming an increasingly crucial tool
for both attackers and defenders in cybersecurity
domains. However, existing formal models provide little
guidance on the effectiveness of deception, the amount
of effort needed to sufficiently disguise deceptive
objects against motivated attackers, of the limits of
deception based on the costs of modifying the features of
the deceptive objects. Also, most analyses only consider
how to make deceptive objects look real, and not how
real objects can be modified to look more like deceptive
ones to make the task of deception easier. We present a
formal game-theoretic model of this problem, capturing
the key problem of disguising deceptive objects among
real objects when an attacker may observe external
features/characteristics.
Our model of HFSG allows us to investigate many
aspects of how a defender should optimize efforts
to conceal deceptive objects, which can be applied
to honeypots, disguising network traffic, and other
domains. This also gives a more theoretical foundation
to understand the benefits and limitations of adversarial
learning methods for generating deceptive objects. We
show that the symmetry or asymmetry of the costs of
modifying features is critical to whether we need to
consider 2-sided deception as part of the strategy, and
we also show that in some cases deception is either
unnecessary or too costly to be effective. Also, the
sophistication of the attackers makes a great difference;
in cases with naı̈ve attackers deception is even more
effective, even when considering a low-cost strategy.
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